The role of port size and incentives in the choice of location by port users: A game-theoretic approach

Paper Details

Authors:

DOI: 10.1016/S2092-5212(10)80011-2

Journal: Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics

Year: 2010

Publisher: Korean Association of Shipping and Logistics, Inc.

Document Type: Article

Open Access: All Open Access; Gold Open Access

Cited by: 6

Abstract

Fierce inter-port competition requires to strategically consider the roles port size and incentives play in a port user's port selection. This paper contributes to literature by developing a simple game-theoretic model to address this particular issue. We demonstrate that once port is selected the port size and the administered incentive level positively influences the level of port user's production; that the port's marginal cost incentive rate can change the firm's location given the relative size of the ports; the changes in the incentive level set at one port should be more than the inversed relative port size to the other port.

Keywords

Incentives; Port competition; Port selection

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