CEO power and bank risk-taking: A revisit in an emerging market context

Paper Details

Authors: Pham N.A.; Ngo T.Q.

DOI: 10.3934/QFE.2026001

Journal: Quantitative Finance and Economics

Year: 2026

Publisher: American Institute of Mathematical Sciences

Document Type: Article

Open Access: All Open Access; Gold Open Access

Cited by: 0

Abstract

This study examines the impact of chief executive officers' (CEOs)' power on banks' risktaking for publicly listed commercial banks in Vietnam from 2011 to 2021. Using generalized least square (GLS) random effect (RE) estimation, this study finds that the presence of powerful CEOs, with a large share of ownership and a role as the chairperson of the bank boards, reduce banks' risk-taking. Regarding other bank governance factors, a larger bank board results in lower bank risk-taking, while board independence, in contrast, is positively associated with bank risk. These results are robust to different proxies for banks' risk-taking and different estimation techniques. © 2026 the Author(s).

Keywords

bank governance; bank risk-taking; CEO power; commercial banks

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